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DO WE NEED FISCAL RULES?1
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak
OFCE
The public finances crisis has brought binding fiscal rules proposals back to 
the forefront. The paper analyses their justifications and specifications, either 
in a classical or in a Keynesian framework. In the recent period there is no 
evidence that public deficits were caused by fiscal indiscipline and induced too 
high interest rates; there is no evidence that economically relevant rules can be 
designed. The paper provides an analysis of fiscal rules implemented either at 
country level (like the UK golden rule), or at the EU level (the Stability and 
Growth Pact). The paper shows that fiscal rules did not work before and during 
the crisis. The paper discusses the EU project, the “Fiscal Pact”, which risks to 
paralyse fiscal policies and to prevent economic stabilisation. The priority today 
is not to strengthen public finance discipline but to question economic deve-
lopments which make public deficits necessary to support output. 
Keywords: Fiscal policy, Fiscal rules.
In memory of Henner Will
The 2007-2012 crisis is first of all a banking and financial 
crisis, due to hazardous and unregulated financial innovations, in 
a context of financial liberalisation and globalisation. Markets 
1. Preliminary versions of this paper were presented at the OFCE conference: “Public finances 
in the crisis”, Paris, May 2010, at the 15th Conference of the Research Network Macroeconomics 
and Macroeconomic Policies (FMM), Berlin, October 2011, and at the 9th EUROFRAME 
Conference, Kiel, June 2012. We would like to thank participants at the three Conferences and 
more especially Achim Truger for their comments and suggestions. A shorter version of an 
earlier draft was released in “From crisis to growth?, The challenge of debt and imbalances, Series 
of the Research Network Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Policies, Vol. 15,  H. Herr, T. Niechoj, 
C. Thomasberger, A. Truger and T. van Treeck (eds), Metropolis-Verlag, Marburg 2012. All 
remaining errors are ours.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 127 (2013)
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak190were greedy, blind, and volatile. The crisis is also due to the huge 
increase in capital stocks coming from neo-mercantilist econo-
mies, raw material exporting economies, pension funds, or the 
wealthiest in emerging and advanced economies, tracking the 
most profitable financial opportunities. Monetary policies allowed 
private debts to rise, financial and housing bubbles, which 
supported output growth without higher wages or social incomes. 
Last but not least, the world economy became more fragile due to 
the strategies run by mercantilist countries (like China and other 
Asian emerging economies, Germany, and other Northern Europe 
economies) pursuing competitiveness gains and cumulating 
external surpluses (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2011).
But the crisis is not due to the rise in public debts and deficits. 
At the end of 2007, the public deficit for the OECD as a whole 
amounted to 1.3% of GDP only and was therefore below the level 
ensuring debt stability. Net public debt amounted to 39% of GDP 
only. 
The crisis led to a huge rise in government debts and deficits. 
Initially this rise in debts and deficits was due to government 
measures implemented to support banks, later to the automatic 
fall in tax revenues resulting from lower output growth, and finally 
to measures implemented to support output. Starting from mid-
2009, markets pretended to have doubts about public finance 
sustainability. They requested higher risk premia on government 
bonds issued by some euro area countries. Proposals aiming at 
imposing governments either fiscal policy rules or independent 
Councils in charge of assessing or even setting fiscal policies are 
back to the forefront. 
The issue is especially acute in the euro area, where existing 
rules did not work (especially the Stability and Growth Pact, SGP), 
and where Member States (MS) having lost monetary sovereignty 
are under direct financial market pressure, where the Greek crisis 
has  shown the implicit solidarity linking all euro area MS. The ECB 
and some of the countries having agreed to help Southern 
countries wish in counterpart the strengthening of binding rules 
on domestic fiscal policies. 
The objective of monetary policy is rather clear: maintaining 
low and stable inflation, the equilibrium unemployment rate 
Do we need fiscal rules? 191theory ensuring that monetary policy will lead to the highest 
employment level. The issue is more delicate for fiscal policy: 
should it target full employment or the equilibrium of public 
finances, and how to define the latter? What is an optimal fiscal 
policy? Can rules allowing to run an optimal fiscal policy in 
permanence be defined? 
The paper has four parts. Section 1 deals with the justifications 
for fiscal policy rules, either in a classical or in a Keynesian 
framework, trying to make a link between the justifications and 
the proposed rules. Section 2 describes different kinds of rules that 
may be implemented. Section 3 provides an analysis of fiscal rules 
experiences. Section 4 discusses recent EU proposals. Section 5 
concludes. 
1. Fiscal rules, from justifications to specifications
1.1. The classical model
Fiscal rules proponents argue that governments are not benevo-
lent2. Governments do not aim at optimising citizens’ welfare but 
aim at being re-elected. Besides, each generation is selfish and does 
not care about the situation for future generations. Last, financial 
markets need to be reassured on the ability of governments to 
service debt. Each of these goals induces a specific rule. 
According to the Leviathan-State theory or the Public Choice 
theory, each social group seeks to benefit from higher public spen-
ding without considering that this will imply higher taxes. In a 
non-cooperative equilibrium public expenditure are excessive. 
Each government agency aims at increasing the number of civil 
servants and means at their disposal, without accounting for effi-
ciency and productivity. Governments tend to spend too much in 
order to please their voters, without correspondingly increasing 
taxes. They use fiscal policy for electoral purposes and not for stabi-
lisation purposes. They do not make the appropriate budgetary 
efforts in good economic times. The social choice between public 
expenditure and taxes is biased because governments can run defi-
2. See, for instance, Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Drazen (2004), 
Wyplosz (2011). 
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of government debt or deficit. Thus public deficits are always 
excessive and this leads to excessive public debts. 
Public deficits are therefore an autonomous cause of macroeco-
nomic unbalances. According to the “crowding-out” effect theory, 
public deficits generate excessive demand, which induces higher 
interest rates and crowds-out private spending. Public deficits 
reduce savings available for investment. The current deficit level 
leads financial markets to expect large deficits to persist and hence 
further increases in government debts. Markets anticipate high 
future long-term interest rates, which immediately increases inte-
rest rates, and crowds-out private investment (Ducoudré, 2005). 
Public deficits are detrimental to capital accumulation and there-
fore to future growth.
Three objections can be made to this reasoning. The first objec-
tion is theoretical. The described mechanisms will not play if 
households are Ricardian. On the one hand, Ricardian households 
are aware that a deficit is equivalent to taxes: they cannot be fooled 
by the government strategy and they have a preference for govern-
ments who do not spend much. On the other hand, Ricardian 
households increase their savings in order to offset higher public 
deficits; public debt has no specific unfavourable effect: financing 
public expenditure through taxation or higher indebtedness will 
be similarly detrimental to output growth.
The second objection is empirical. Such mechanisms of higher 
interest rates and crowding-out effects have hardly been observed 
in reality. From 2002 to 2005 both short and long-term interest 
rates were historically low despite the rise in government deficits 
in Europe, like in the US and Japan. This has also been the case 
since 2008: large economies have run large government deficits 
and high public debts with low interest rates at the same time. The 
rise in government debts did not have any impact on interest rate 
levels or on inflation expectations. In 2009, long-term interest 
rates stood at 1.4% in Japan, 3.3% in Germany and the US, 3.6% in 
the UK, 3.7% in France, i.e. were similar to expected potential 
output growth (and were even clearly below it for the US). It is 
difficult to assert that such interest rates levels are detrimental to 
investment.
Do we need fiscal rules? 193Last, this theory does not explain why all governments would 
have suddenly become demagogic and increased their deficits in 
2002 or in 2009. In the recent past, the rise in government deficits 
was due to fiscal stabilisation rather than to a spontaneous rise in 
expenditure or a spontaneous decrease in tax revenues. It is not 
obvious that the OECD countries were characterized, in the recent 
period, by fiscal indiscipline (contrary to what Debrun and Kumar,
2007; and Wyplosz, 2011, 2012 pretend). 
This theory omits that governments do not care only about 
median voters but also about leading classes requesting primarily 
lower taxation for companies or for themselves and trying to 
promote public spending cuts strategies. 
In any case, this theory advocates the implementation of a 
“Golden rule of public finances” in order to reduce the govern-
ments’ bias for running excessive deficits: current expenditure 
must be financed through taxation, while investment which will 
benefit future generations may be financed through borrowing.3
It is however difficult to measure investment. How to account 
for education or research expenditure, even more since we have to 
measure net investment? Besides, it is fair to smooth exceptional 
public spending and tax revenues over all generations. Despite 
these limits, the rule, according to the classical theory, should be a 
golden rule and not a balanced budget rule.
This rule can be more precisely defined. Let us assume that a 
country wishes to maintain a public debt level equal to its public 
capital stock. Public debt in real terms varies as: 
, where  stands for the real interest rate 
and Sp is the primary government balance. The public capital stock 
level varies as: . The equality between debt and 
capital stock requires that: . 
Government borrowing should equal net public investment plus 
debt depreciation due to inflation.  
The second argument is intergenerational fairness. A given 
generation should not consume too much at the expense of future 
generations. But such an “excessive consumption” is difficult to 
3. This view was developed at the end of the 19th century by Von Stein (1885), Leroy-Beaulieu 
(1891) and Jèze (1896). It can also be found for instance in Musgrave (1939) or Eisner (1989).
1(1 ) pD D r Sπ−= + − − r π−
1 1K K I Kδ− −= + −
1 1 1( )pS S rD I K Dδ π− − −= − = − − +
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productivity growth, natural resources and environmental 
constraints. It is difficult to compare the well-being of successive 
generations. In this approach, the criterion cannot bear exclusively 
on the public deficit; private savings need also to be taken into 
account. According to the “golden rule of economic growth”, per 
capita consumption is maximised in a permanent regime if the 
interest rate equals GDP growth. As long as the interest rate does 
not exceed GDP growth, there is no evidence that fairness is not 
ensured. Intergenerational fairness may thus require a fiscal 
surplus (if the savings ratio is spontaneously too low) or a deficit (if 
the savings ratio is too high). 
The third argument is public debt sustainability. Financial 
markets should not believe that a country may be a situation where 
sovereign default is the more profitable outcome. Let sp, stand for 
the primary government balance-to-GDP ratio, , the interest rate 
on debt corrected from GDP growth, h, the debt-to-GDP ratio. At a 
given debt ratio, , one should avoid that h exceeds a critical 
value where the primary balance would be unbearable for the 
population. The difficulty is that  depends itself on sustainability 
perceived by markets. Countries like Greece, Italy, or Belgium, 
have been able to run primary surpluses of 5 percentage points of 
GDP. If = 1%, the limit for h is 500%. If  = 5%, the limit comes 
down to 100%. An indebted country is at risk of being trapped in a 
self-fulfilling spiral if financial markets require high interest rates 
to offset an unsustainability risk.
Moreover, it is necessary to make a difference between countries 
with monetary sovereignty, borrowing in their own currency and 
able to ask for central bank financing (Nersisyan and Wray, 2011), 
and non-sovereign countries, borrowing in foreign currency or not 
able to benefit from central bank financing, like euro area countries. 
The latter do not control their interest rate; they may have to 
pay risk premia; they may default. These countries may be trapped 
in a spiral: financial markets’ doubts -> increases in interest rates -> 
unsustainable debt -> financial markets’ doubts. Debt substainabi-
lity is a crucial issue for these countries.
The former may run very low interest rates and are not in 
danger of being insolvent since the Central Bank can provide 
r
ps rh=
r
r r
Do we need fiscal rules? 195funding to the government. Coordination between fiscal and 
monetary policies can maintain full employment after a negative 
demand shock. The risk is that over-expansionary fiscal policies 
lead the central bank to raise interest rates to stabilise inflation, 
which may lead public debt to be unsustainable, or to abandon its 
inflation target (Sargent and Wallace, 1981, Leeper, 1991, Sterdy-
niak and Villa, 1994). This cannot occur with the following rule: 
fiscal policy must maintain a satisfactory employment level, while 
enabling the interest rate not to be higher than the nominal 
growth rate, with stable inflation at a satisfactory level.
1.2. The Keynesian model
From a Keynesian perspective, a certain level of public debt and 
deficit is necessary to ensure that demand equals potential output. 
Public deficits result from the macroeconomic situation and are 
not at the origin of this situation. In times of economic uncer-
tainty or entrepreneurs’ pessimism, private demand may be 
insufficient to maintain full employment. The optimal policy 
consists in cutting the interest rate until the demand level is satis-
factory. The advantage of this policy is that it does not increase 
public debt, it helps capital accumulation and lowers the profit rate 
requested by companies to invest. However, it may lead to exces-
sive private companies’ or households’ debt accumulation. It may 
generate financial or housing bubbles. Conversely interest rates 
cuts may be inefficient in times of strong economic depression, 
when private agents are reluctant to borrow. It may be insufficient, 
especially because there is a floor to nominal and consequently to 
real interest rates: at the end of the 1990’s, the daily interest rate 
was set at 0 in Japan, which led to a base rate of around 3% for 
commercial banks and to a real credit interest rate of 4.5% (accoun-
ting for a price deflation of around 1.5% per year). It may not be 
implementable in the euro area where the common interest rate 
cannot adjust to the different business cycle situations in the 
17 MS. So the sharp rise in public debts must be related to decelera-
ting inflation and growth (which prevents the authorities to cut 
sufficiently the real interest rate adjusted for growth) and to the
introduction of the euro (which does not allow anymore MS to run 
appropriate interest rates and exchange rates).
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak196In order to obtain a satisfactory demand level, the government 
must then accept some public deficit. Let us note y, the output gap, 
d,  private demand, g public demand, r the interest rate, and  h
public debt-to-GDP ratio,
If , the stabilisation fiscal policy is: 
If this policy is implemented and if stabilisation is perfect, then 
there is no link ex post between the deficit and the output gap. g, 
government borrowing, is considered as structural according to the 
OECD or the EC methods, which makes no sense. 
In the long run, g = 0 and .
The long-term public debt level is not arbitrary, but depends on 
private agents’ wishes: debt must equal desired debt at the optimal 
interest rate, i.e. the rate equal to the growth rate. 
This simple model shows that a fiscal rule like:
 should not be recommended, since it 
would not allow for full stabilisation and since the government 
cannot set a debt target regardless of private agents’ saving behav-
iour. The public debt level desired by private agents has probably 
increased during the crisis since households wish to hold less risky
financial assets and companies want to deleverage. In structural 
terms, the ageing of populations implies that safe public assets are
increasingly desired. 
Such a deficit necessary to support activity will not crowd out 
private spending: it will not raise the interest rate, since by defini-
tion the interest rate is as low as possible. It does not raise 
sustainability issues a priori: if the rise in public debt leads agents to 
increase their spending, the government will be able to cut its 
deficit accordingly. The government must be ready to cut its deficit 
when private demand resumes. This may require that some public 
expenditure or some tax cuts are explicitly defined as temporary.
This ideal scheme requires that the government cuts the public 
deficit when the economy comes close to full employment. The 
rule should be: the public deficit must be reduced when demand
tends to become excessive, therefore when inflation tends to acce-
lerate or when the central bank has to raise its interest rate above 
the output growth rate in order to slowdown inflation.
y g d cy r khσ= + + − +
g d rσ= − +
( ) /h d r kσ= − −
( )g g y h hλ μ°= − − −
Do we need fiscal rules? 197Box 1.  A Keynesian fiscal policy rule? 
Can a Keynesian fiscal rule be designed? Net public investment (NPI) 
must be financed through borrowing; public deficit should be corrected 
of debt depreciation induced by inflation (at least for a 2% inflation 
target and a 60% debt target); fiscal policy should be countercyclical: a 
1% output gap justifies a 0.75% of GDP public deficit, i.e. slightly more 
than the automatic effect; fiscal policy should be restrictive when 
monetary policy is restrictive (a fiscal surplus is needed when the inte-
rest rate set by the ECB exceeds 4%, the “golden-rule” growth rate, 
according to Phelps). Therefore:
S=-NPI-1.2% + 0.75 output gap + 0.5 (i-4) 
According to this sensible fiscal rule, which ensures that public debt 
does not exceed public capital stock in the long-term, and using the 
OECD output gap, the French public deficit should have amounted in 
2011 to:   
1.2+1.2 +0.75*3.3+1.25 = 6.2% of GDP. The French public deficit 
amounted in fact to 5.2% of GDP.
But this rule does not allow for full stabilisation and does not take 
intro consideration the link between the output gap and fiscal policy.
According to this approach, the rise in public debts is a macroe-
conomic phenomenon with two causes: insufficient private 
demand and too high interest rates. Weak demand may mirror 
households’ desire to own more financial assets combined with 
companies refusing to increase their borrowing. 
Pierre is 50 year-old and worries about his future pension. He 
decides to save 1,000 euros per month so as to have cumulated 
120,000 euros at the age of 60. Hence he generates a demand 
deficit. If interest rates cannot be cut, the government must 
increase its deficit by 12,000 euros per year and the public debt by 
120,000 euros after 10 years. Will this debt be a burden for 
Antoine, Pierre’s son? The answer is no if Pierre donates 120,000 
euros to his son. The answer is also no if Pierre spends this amount 
while Paul, Peter’s cousin and 10 years younger saves money over 
this period. The 120,000 euros are a desired additional debt. In 
such a situation, government should allow public debt to rise. The 
government stabilises the economy through providing the desired 
public debt. Public deficits increase demand directly but also indi-
rectly by raising public debt, owned by households, which tends to 
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generations since it has a counterpart in terms of assets owned by 
households. Public debt is only a way to make the economy more 
liquid. Households’ savings have a counterpart in terms in public 
debt and deficit. One may of course regret that it has no counter-
part in terms of private companies’ investment and debt, but in the 
context we are considering, companies do not wish to borrow.
This scheme may come to a halt if households become Ricar-
dian, if markets request risk premia, or if the government sets a 
public debt target (for simulations, see Ben Amar and Sterdyniak, 
2011). Let us assume that households increase their savings’ ratios 
because they wish to own more public debt as they get older. The 
government thus increases public debt, but households expect 
future tax increases (they are wrong, of course): they increase their 
savings further, which obliges the government to increase its 
deficit further. Another example is: households increase their 
savings ratio; the government has to increase its deficit to stabilise 
output, but markets request risk premia to offset the debt rise. Here 
also, the economy may enter into an infernal spiral: higher interest 
rates requested by markets will lead the government to increase its 
debt to maintain full-employment, which will worry markets, and 
increase debt again. In both cases, private agents’ defiance towards 
public debt is a self-fulfilling prophecy; output cannot be stabilised 
(see Box 2).
Thus public debt can be cut only through higher companies’ or 
households’ borrowing or lower savings (owing to reduced uncer-
tainty about the future). Public debt reduction requests interest 
rates to be kept as low as possible. When government borrowing is 
of a Keynesian type, it makes no sense to advocate a strong cut in 
government borrowing without explaining how the resulting 
demand deficit will be offset.
Hence, there are two views on public debts and deficits, like on 
the need for fiscal rules. Fiscal rules proponents may blame Keyne-
sians for opening a Pandora’s box. How to avoid government’s 
demagogic choices, once debts and deficits are allowed? Fiscal rules 
opponents may reply that the fiscal policy adequacy criterion lies 
on both the employment level, inflation, and interest rates. They 
may request rules consistent with the macroeconomic stabilisation 
objective.
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Let us consider the simplest model.
Public balance is: s = ty-g, where g stands for discretionary policy.
GDP is: y = d + g + c(1-t)y + ny*- ny  where d is a private demand shock.
Let us assume that t =0.5; c=0.5; n=0.25.
The multiplier equals 1 for a specific shock; 1.33 for a EU wide shock. 
The public balance stabilisation constraint increases it to 2 for a specific 
shock, 4 for a EU wide shock. The economy is more unstable under a 
balanced budget constraint. 
 Let us now assume that households are Ricardian or that financial 
markets request risk premia for public deficits. This will translate 
through (-hs) in the equation determining output:  y = d + g + c(1-t)y + 
ny* – ny – hs, where h = 0.5. Then fiscal policy is less efficient. The 
economy is here also more unstable in the event of a negative demand 
shock. It cannot be stabilised if h becomes equal to or higher than 1.
For neo-classical economists, the rise in deficits and public 
debts in recent years shows that rules are needed to avoid this drift.
For Keynesians, this rise was necessary and fiscal rules are harmful
if they prevent fiscal policy to play.
However, the fundamental question is: why are large public 
deficits necessary today at the world level in order to support 
demand? Prior to the crisis, four factors contributed to insufficient 
world demand: 
— Many countries implemented neo-mercantilist strategies 
aiming at building current account surpluses: Asian countries 
Specific shock EU shock 
y s y s
Full stabilisation of y  0 -1  0 -1
Automatic stabiliser -1 -0.5 -1.33 -0.67
s stabilisation -2  0 -4  0
Cost of reducing deficits -2 -1 -4 -1
Specific shock EU shock 
y s y s
Full stabilisation of y  0 -1  0 -2
Automatic stabiliser -1.33 -0.67 -2 -1
s stabilisation -2  0 -1  0
Cost of reducing deficits -0,667 -1 -1 -1
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak200learnt the lesson from the 1997 crisis and wish to be free of finan-
cial markets’ pressure; China’s rapid growth model is based on 
exports; some countries wish to anticipate the implications of their 
ageing populations (Japan, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, 
and Nordic countries). These surpluses add to oil exporting 
countries’ surpluses. 
— Trade globalisation increases the weight of international 
competitiveness. Each country has an incentive to exert downward 
pressure on their wages so as to raise domestic competitiveness. 
Countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Austria have 
succeeded in lowering substantially the wage share in value added 
since 2000. Consequently consumption has decreased as a share of 
GDP in these countries. Accounting for globalisation and for the 
interests of leading classes no country implements the relevant 
strategy: supporting output growth through higher wages and 
social benefits4.
— Anglo-Saxon economies have chosen a growth strategy 
based on wages and incomes stagnation for households as a whole 
and a rise in inequalities. This implies a declining consumption 
trend which was offset by higher households’ borrowing and 
financial and housing bubbles, allowed by real interest rates main-
tained at low levels. When households’ borrowing reaches a 
paroxysm and when bubbles burst, public debt has to support 
demand. 
— The rise in public debt in France and in many countries does 
not result from rising public expenditure, since on the contrary the 
latter have decreased as a share of GDP (by 1.4 percentage point in 
the euro area between 1997 and 2007, 0.8 percentage point in 
France), but from lower tax receipts (by 1.5 percentage point in the 
euro area as in France over the same period) due to the tax counter-
revolution implemented by most governments for 25 years. In the 
name of free movement of people and capital, EU institutions have 
forbidden countries to implement measures needed to protect 
their tax policies. Hence EU governments have used tax competi-
tion. Tax and contributions cuts have been intensified (on 
corporate taxation, higher-income households, wealth, employers’ 
4. Strangely, the European Commission and economists in the industrial economies 
recommend this strategy … but for China. 
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policies have increased social inequalities and public deficits. 
Simultaneously the tax counter-revolution was a choice of EU 
institutions, liberal governments and leading classes as a way to 
cut tax revenues, and pretend afterwards that in view of the resul-
ting deficit, public expenditure need to be cut. 
2. Fiscal rules: lessons from experience
2.1.  A typology for fiscal rules
A fiscal rule5 may be defined as a fiscal policy constraint which 
imposes limits on variables like deficit, public debt or public 
expenditure, either in absolute terms or depending on some 
economic variables. The introduction of fiscal rules has been 
strongly advocated by the IMF, in order to facilitate domestic fiscal 
policies discipline or surveillance by the IMF (see IMF, 2009). 
There are different types of rules according to several criteria 
(see also EC, 2010): 
— Some rules set permanently what fiscal policy should be: for 
instance, the structural deficit should be nil or equal to net public 
investment. Other rules set a ceiling: public deficit should not 
exceed 3% of GDP; debt should not exceed 60% of GDP. Such rules 
play in an asymmetrical and episodic way. 
In the first case, the difficulty is how to design a rule able to 
account for all situations. Generally, these rules are based on magic 
numbers (like budgetary positions in balance), unrelated with 
macroeconomic equilibrium constraints. The balanced govern-
ment budget rule for instance has no economic justification once 
it is recognised that a certain level of public debt is necessary 
(because public debt is desired by private agents who wish to own 
safe assets), and that besides, it is justified to finance public invest-
ment through borrowing. Let us assume for instance that 
households wish to own public debt at 60% of GDP under a 4% 
interest rate and a 4% nominal growth. The equilibrium govern-
5. This paper addresses national rules only and does not discuss rules imposed on local 
governments.
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak202ment deficit is 2.4%. It makes no sense to request a deficit at 0%, 
which could require an interest rate at below GDP growth. 
In the second case, the rule bites in times of crisis, precisely 
when output needs fiscal policy support, and not in good times, 
when fiscal consolidation would possibly not be detrimental to 
growth. The ceiling is here also generally arbitrary. 
— Rules can apply to government borrowing, structural 
balance, public debt, expenditure or taxes. But government 
borrowing depends on the cyclical situation: a norm on govern-
ment borrowing is necessarily pro-cyclical. The structural balance 
is difficult to measure. The debt criterion is difficult to fulfil as, in 
the short run, a restrictive policy can increase the debt-ratio (see 
Box 3). Should a rigid rule constrain the social choice between 
public and private expenditure? This is not justified from a demo-
cratic point of view. Expenditure rules generate incentives to 
introduce tax expenditure. The rule in terms of tax revenues is 
often counter-productive: it leads governments to increase 
borrowing rather than raise taxes. 
Box 3.  The public debt criterion in the short term
Let us consider an economy in a Keynesian situation. Demand deter-
mines output, according to: . Debt varies as: 
. If g declines by 1, this leads y to fall by 1/1-c(1-t). A 
restrictive fiscal policy will lead the debt-to-GDP ratio to rise if: 
For instance: if c=0.5 and t=0.5, , cutting the deficit by 1 
leads output to fall by 1.33 (from 100 to 98.67), ex post the deficit will 
fall by 0.33. Debt will decrease to 99.67. The debt-to-GDP ratio rises 
from 100% to 101%. In the short run, a restrictive policy cannot cut the 
debt-to-GDP ratio. 
— Rules can have annual, medium-term (debt or deficit targets 
set at a five-year horizon) or long-term (ensuring public finance 
sustainability) horizons. But an annual rule often comes into
conflict with the short-term economic context. A medium-term
rule allows postponing efforts and may lack credibility; it implies 
commitments for the future while ignoring the future short-term 
situation. A long-term rule is not very useful: even if a country
(1 )y g c t y= + −
0h h g ty= + −
0 0/ (1 )(1 )h y c t> − −
0 0 100h y= =
Do we need fiscal rules? 203anticipates a strong increase in its future pension expenditures, an
immediate increase in social contributions is counterproductive
when demand is insufficient.
Some economists recommend fiscal policy to be run at two 
horizons: in the short-run, expansionary fiscal policies would be 
allowed; in the longer-term the implementation of rigid fiscal rules 
or announcements of future pensions or health reforms would 
reassure financial markets (see for instance Schick, 2010). But this 
is probably an illusion: What is the credibility of such policies? 
— Rules may consist in a simple objective set out by the govern-
ment. This case has the advantage of being soft: the government 
may amend its objective or may not fulfil it if needed, possibly 
explaining why.  
Rules may be supervised by an external authority (Committees 
of experts, Parliament, Constitutional court, EU Commission), 
which may be entitled to give advice only or to impose the fulfil-
ment of the rule. But how should this authority be appointed: is 
fiscal policy a technical or a political issue? The supervising autho-
rity may be given the mandate to give advice, to dialogue with the 
government. Going beyond this is hardly consistent with demo-
cratic principles. 
— Rules may be written into Law or into the Constitution. But 
all possible events cannot be written into the law. If the text is too 
vague (for instance: fiscal policy should target a balanced budget) it 
may be ineffective. If the text is too precise (for instance: a 
balanced structural balance), it is unenforceable. 
Wyplosz (2002) proposed establishing a national fiscal policy 
committee of independent experts (how would they be 
appointed?). This Committee would have to regulate fiscal policy, 
i.e. to set the public deficit level, while public spending and 
receipts would remain under the responsibility of national govern-
ments and parliaments. After the ECB’s independence, it would be 
a new step towards leaving economic policy entirely in the hands 
of a technocracy. The Committee’s mandate would be to ensure 
public debt long-run sustainability, while output stabilisation 
would come in second. 
But Wyplosz has difficulty in defining debt sustainability. He 
makes two suggestions: a balanced budget over the economic cycle 
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stabilisation of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the medium run (i.e. cycli-
cally adjusted), but he admits that it is impossible to set  an 
appropriate level for this ratio. 
As concerns monetary policy, the central Bank’s objective is 
rather clear6: ensuring low and stable inflation rates, the equilib-
rium unemployment rate theory ensuring that monetary policy 
will lead to the maximal employment level. The fiscal policy objec-
tive is less obvious: should fiscal policy target full employment or 
public finances in balance, and how to define the latter? Should 
public debt be reimbursed or is public debt necessary for the macr-
oeconomic equilibrium? This is a political choice which belongs to 
voters and not to experts (Murray and Wilkes, 2009). Wyplosz
(2011) recognises that this committee should follow rules, but he 
does not define them: will rules bear only on public finance vari-
ables or will they account for the macroeconomic context? 
Economic developments lead effective budget to differ from 
budget plans. The Committee would therefore have to control in 
permanence government policy measures and oblige the govern-
ment to change taxes. What government would accept this? 
Why would citizens be asked to vote for political parties’ repre-
sentatives if fiscal decisions are made by non elected independent 
experts? Can economic policy choices be made independently of a 
macroeconomic strategy and without democratic debate? 
The crisis has clearly shown that fiscal policy cannot obey rules 
and must be run by determined and brave governments, which 
will never be the case with experts’ committees. Can we imagine 
that a group of experts would have opposed to banks’ financial 
support or to active stabilisation policies in 2008-2009 in the name 
of public finance sustainability? 
Fatas et al. (2003) proposed a Sustainability Council, who would 
assess fiscal policies according to sustainability criteria. Their judg-
ment would be made public, so as inform financial markets and 
the general public. The problem is that sustainability is a vague 
concept, which makes sense as a long-term constraint only. This 
6. Although this objective has become less clear under the financial crisis’ developments. 
Should the Central Bank ensure financial and banking system stability, supervise it, or rescue it?
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policy run in a given year. It would require judgements on the 
output gap level, on optimal debt, on the need for discretionary 
fiscal measures. Why would these experts be more qualified than 
others to have an opinion on so difficult issues? The risk is that 
these experts help markets to have a single opinion and that they 
exert excessive influence. 
Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) consider that a fiscal council 
could fight the deficit bias of governments. They recognise that 
fiscal rules are often too rigid. The fiscal council should induce 
governments to fulfil rules, but would also allow for flexibility and 
for possibly not fulfilling them. However, the fiscal council would 
have a consultative role only.
Others simply suggest setting an independent fiscal policy 
committee in charge of assessing macroeconomic projections’ 
credibility and whether fiscal assessments are realistic. This is 
already the case in many countries. But should there be a single and 
official Committee? Would not this paralyse the democratic 
debate? There is a risk that such a Committee initiates a vicious 
circle: lower expected output growth and hence a higher deficit and 
hence a more restrictive fiscal policy in order to meet the deficit 
target at any cost, at the price of a further fall in output growth. 
— How should the position of the economy in the business 
cycle be accounted for? Should the fiscal rule apply only to the 
structural balance (knowing all measurement difficulties)? Should 
discretionary fiscal policy be forbidden? What should a govern-
ment do after a major depressive shock: give up the fiscal rule in 
order to support growth or try to meet the rule at the risk of
slowing down the recovery?
— The non fulfilment of the rule may lead to no sanction 
(except by the general public), may be subject to fines (in the case 
of international commitments), may be impossible (if the 
surveillance authority is entitled to constrain the government or if 
the rule is automatic). 
The last two cases raise feasibility and democratic issues. In the 
event of a deep depression, a rule may be unenforceable or may 
have disastrous macroeconomic consequences. Why could a group 
of experts oblige an elected government to run a given policy?
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that euro area Member States make commitments to bring their 
structural deficit in balance and thereafter maintain it in balance. 
Any deviation from the path would be corrected through an auto-
matic rise in taxes. But this would prevent any stabilisation fiscal 
policy; this supposes that the structural balance can be available in 
real time, and that the structural balance equilibrium matches 
macroeconomic equilibrium.
Delpla (2010) suggests that the balanced budget rule is written 
into the Constitution. The rule would apply to the structural 
balance. An independent fiscal Committee (IFC) would be settled 
and requested to assess the structural balance. The rule would 
apply from 2018 only. Until then, the structural deficit, estimated 
at 8% of GDP in 2010, would have to be cut by 1 percent of GDP 
per year without accounting for the business cycle situation. 
In a permanent regime, deficits (due to a deviation between 
effective and voted budgets) would be cumulated in a notional 
account and would have to be amortised in seven years. If the 
finance law project (PLF) deviates from this rule, it will be judged 
not in conformity with the Constitution by the Constitutional 
Council. In case of recession (to be defined by the IFC), the rule 
would be put aside for N years, but cumulated deficits would have 
to be offset in the following years. The rule would not be applied in 
case of exceptional circumstances, voted by the Parliament. 
In case of structural reforms (raising output growth or reducing 
implicit debt) the IFC could allow for a certain level of deficit. This 
would open the door to drifts: 2% of deficit for the introduction of 
the “Contrat Première embauche” (Scheme for young employment), 
5% for the abolition of the minimum wage, etc…
Thus, the rule would only apply when net public debt is higher 
than 40% of GDP. In France, it would have been applied only from 
1996 to 1998, and since 2008. 
This proposal lies on strong assumptions, lacking evidence: 
1. The optimal level of net public debt is 40% of GDP.
2. Any level of deficit may be run, private demand or interest 
rates will adjust. 
3. Discretionary deficits should be forbidden. 
4. Structural government balances may be assessed in real time. 
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with high flexibility. This is how rules worked until recently.  
2.2. National rules
Many countries have introduced in their constitution rules 
with no real impact, either because these rules are vague and not 
really binding, or because they are abandoned when they become 
binding. 
There is no fiscal rule in the US. There is a public debt ceiling, 
which can be raised when needed, which may be the opportunity 
to make medium-term fiscal commitments. Since 1974, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has played a significant role in 
producing reports on the medium-term fiscal outlook and on fiscal 
policy costs. The situation is similar in the Netherlands, where the 
Centraal Planbureau (CPB) plays an important expertise role, in 
Sweden (with a Fiscal Policy Council), in Belgium (High Council of 
Finance) and in Denmark (Economic Council).
In Germany under the Stability National Pact, the central and 
local governments are not allowed to run deficits exceeding the 
amount of their investments. They should target a budgetary posi-
tion in balance. 
 In Spain, the Fiscal Stability Law from 2004 states that “all levels 
of government should aim at budgetary positions in balance”. 
In the UK, the New Labour government introduced in 1998 a 
“Code for fiscal stability”, embedding two rules. The golden rule 
for public finances states that the government shall be allowed to 
borrow only to invest over an economic cycle. The sustainable 
investment rule states that net public debt should remain at a 
stable and prudent level, set at 40% of GDP. 
The golden rule has an economic justification since it ensures in 
theory that public expenditure are financed by the generations 
which benefit from it. It is appropriate from a cyclical view point: 
in times of recession, government borrowing can increase both 
under the automatic deficit and under discretionary measures, as 
long as this higher borrowing is offset in good economic times. It 
allows governments to borrow to invest, which is particularly 
necessary for countries lagging behind in terms of public invest-
ment. The rule prevents governments from reducing their deficits 
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this rule opens a Pandora’s box on public investment definition: 
should the rule stick to the national accounts’ concept or should 
all expenditure preparing for the future be included, like education 
and research expenditure? The rule implies a risk of excessive 
public investment in bad economic times. 
The golden rule is probably one of the best fiscal rules. However 
it has three drawbacks: it is difficult to implement because it 
assumes that there is a “regular” economic cycle. What should be 
done if the economic cycle turns out to be irregular? The govern-
ment has an incentive to change business cycle dating in order to 
have rooms for manoeuvre. 
The UK golden rule is slightly too strict, since we have seen that 
the appropriate rule is that government borrowing equals net 
public investment augmented by debt depreciation.
Should we recommend the implementation of a golden rule
correctly designed as structural government borrowing excluding 
net public investment and debt depreciation? Balassone and 
Franco (2002) reject this rule in the name of measurement difficul-
ties. The rule requires in fact statisticians to assess the cyclical part 
of government borrowing (therefore the output gap and its impact 
on public finances), public investment and public capital stock 
depreciation, in other words four debatable measures. But is not it 
better to use a fair rule, estimated with some lack of precision than 
to follow a wrong rule, estimated with precision?
A more fundamental criticism is that this rule defines fiscal 
policy neutrality, cyclical neutrality (only automatic stabilisers are 
allowed to work) and structural neutrality (public savings equals 
public investment). But a government may choose not to be 
neutral. It may wish to run an expansionary fiscal policy (in times 
of deep recession) or a restrictive policy (in times of high inflation). 
It may wish to implement structural measures if it judges that 
savings are too high ex ante (which would require a too low interest 
rate) or too low (for instance in the light of demographic develop-
ments). The rule confuses a neutrality criterion with an economic 
policy norm. Nothing guarantees that the fiscal policy needed to 
reach a satisfying output level in a country which does not control 
its interest rate matches the golden rule. 
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rule ensures on its own that net public debt stands below public 
capital stock. 
No mechanism forces the UK government to fulfil the Code; the 
government simply needs to explain why he did not fulfil it and 
how he will fulfil it. The rule allowed the government to increase 
substantially public investment spending starting from 2002, 
which was necessary both for structural (public infrastructure was 
insufficient) and cyclical (to counterbalance the fall in private 
demand after the burst of the internet bubble) reasons. 
In November 2008, in view of public finance deterioration, the 
UK government abandoned the Code for fiscal stability, 
announcing that it would restore public finances once the economy 
would recover. Government borrowing rose rapidly, together with 
net public debt (which reached 60.5% GDP in March 2011). This 
shows clearly that fiscal rules cannot be set as rules “for all seasons”.
Formally, France is already committed to a fiscal rule. Since July 
2008, the Article 34 of the Constitution states that: “The public 
finance multiannual guidelines are defined by programming laws. 
They are part of the target of public finances in balance”. This 
article has had very little influence on fiscal policy implementation 
since then. In times of crisis, multiannual guidelines rapidly lose 
any influence (Table 1). This was the case in 2002 and 2009. 
Table 1. Public balance targets according to the French stability programmes 
In % of GDP
98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
J 99 -2.9 -2.3 -1.2
J 00 -2.1 -1.7 -0.5
J 01 -1.0 -0.6 -0.4 0.2
J 02 -1.4 -1.3 -0.5 0.0
J 03 -2.8 -2.6 -2.1 -1.6 -1.0
J 04 -4.0 -3.5 -2.9 -2.2 -1.5
J 05 -2.9 -2.2 -1.6 -0.9
J 06 -3.0 -2.9 -2.6 -1.9 -1.0
J 07 -2.7 -2.5 -1.8 -0.9 0.0
J 08 -2.4 -2.3 -1.7 -1.2 -0.6 0.0
J 09 -2.9 -3.9 -2.7 -1.9 -1.1
J 10 -7.9 -8.2 -6.0 -4.6 -3.0
J 11 -7.0 -5.7 -4.6 -3.0
Obs. -2.6 -1.8 -1.5 -1.6 -3.2 -4.1 -3.6 -3.0 -2.3 -2.7 -3.3 -7.5 -7.0 -5.2
Source: Stability programmes, Updates (1999-2011).
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the golden rule allows in the medium term a deficit of around 2.5% 
of GDP.
2.3. The Stability and Growth Pact 
Euro area countries are committed to the SGP. This is a unique 
example of a fiscal rule enshrined in an international Treaty, 
which raises a delicate issue: can a Treaty resulting from a political 
compromise, necessarily with simple specifications, contain 
binding economic constraints which may come in contradiction 
with economic principles, and with the needs of relevant fiscal 
policy?
The Pact was based on the assumption that MS domestic fiscal 
policies could have negative impacts on partner countries. But 
only the risk of an over-expansionary policy was taken into consid-
eration, and not the risk of too restrictive policies. The Pact was 
marginally revised in 2005, but its basic principles remained 
unchanged. MS should not run higher than 3% of GDP public defi-
cits and higher than 60% of GDP public debts. MS must produce 
Stability programmes showing 4-year projections for public 
finances, bringing medium-term budgetary positions in balance (a 
1% of GDP deficit is allowed for MS with high growth and low
public debt). Budgetary efforts must reach at least 0.5% of GDP per 
year (measured in terms of primary structural balance, as estimated 
by the Commission). If debt exceeds 60% of GDP, debt should be 
brought down to this value at a satisfactory pace. Once the objec-
tive of the structural balance in equilibrium is reached then it must 
be maintained. Only automatic stabilisers are allowed to play, the 
structural balance being estimated by the Commission’s method.
The European Commission initiates an Excessive Deficit Procedure
(EDP) when a country breaches the 3% of GDP limit for deficits
(unless this excess is temporary) and sets a deadline for the country
to bring its deficit below 3% of GDP. MS not fulfilling their
commitments under an EDP may be subject to fines, but this has 
never been implemented.
The SGP drawbacks have often been analysed (see, for instance 
Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2003, 2006): 
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sion. A country hit by a specific recession may need a higher 
than 3% of GDP deficit to counterbalance a large fall in 
domestic private demand. A priori this will have no negative 
impact on euro area inflation. Such a deficit will have a posi-
tive impact on partner countries since it will prevent spill-
over effects of a fall in demand. In 2002, Germany was 
running a 3.5% of GDP public deficit but inflation was 
growing by 1.4% only and there was a 1.9% of GDP current 
account surplus: one cannot see how the German deficit 
could then have had a negative impact on his partners. 
2. The Pact is blind for two reasons. It bites only at the trough 
of the cycle. But restrictive measures should be taken only 
when the economy at the peak of the cycle. The Pact cannot 
bite for too virtuous countries (who induce other countries 
to be “sinner” countries).
3. The Pact does not take account for issues such as external 
imbalances, competitiveness, private indebtedness, financial 
or housing bubbles.
4. The Pact should allow sanctions for countries running exces-
sive public deficits, inducing inflationary pressures and
excessive deficits, which require the ECB to raise interest 
rates. In fact, countries under an EDP are often countries 
with low growth and low inflation, and which need public 
deficits to support their growth. Conversely, a country like
Spain could enjoy strong and inflationary growth without 
any public deficit but with a large current account deficit. 
5. The rationale for a medium-term budget in balance has no 
economic justification. It is tighter than the golden rule or 
debt stability. In a situation of weak private demand and inte-
rest rates already at a floor, a government budget in balance is 
inconsistent with a satisfactory demand level. A deficit kept 
in permanence at 0% of GDP would lead nominal public debt 
to be stable in level and declining as a percentage of GDP. 
Public debt would reach 0% of GDP at some point. But savers, 
in particular pension funds, need to own long-term, liquid 
and safe assets, in other words public assets.
6. In good economic times, the SGP induces cuts in structural 
government borrowing, but cannot exert pressure on 
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the concept of a good economic situation is problematic: MS 
refused to accept the structural unemployment rate floor as 
calculated by the Commission. In times of depression, the 
rule becomes totally unenforceable. Besides, the distinction 
between a structural and cyclical balance is questionable: 
where should stimulus measures be placed? What about the 
large revenue falls due to the overreaction of corporate and 
income taxation? There is no justification for prohibiting
discretionary fiscal policies. 
7. Since the single interest rate cannot fit all domestic specific 
situations, each MS should be allowed to run fiscal policy in 
order to reach a satisfactory output level (corresponding to 
the natural rate of unemployment). Let us summarise the
EMU functioning by: yi = di + gi –σ r, where yi is the output 
gap, di : private demand and gi : public spending (assumed to 
be equal to the public deficit), r is the common interest rate. 
Then we should have: gi = – di + σ r. On the contrary,
imposing  gi = 0  leads to an unsatisfactory output level. 
8. The SGP implementation relies crucially on the potential 
output growth estimate. This is problematic in times of 
crisis. According to the Commission method, potential 
output deviates relatively little from observed output, so the 
deficit is estimated to be mostly structural.
As Table 2 shows, the 2009 crisis led the Commission to revise
substantially its estimates of potential output before the crisis. For 
2007, the structural deficit increased by 1.2 percentage points at 
the euro area level. The reduction in the deficit between 2006 and 
2007 was revised downwards from 0.5 to 0.1 percentage point In 
2011, was the effort needed to bring the  structural deficit back to 0 
amounting to 3% or 0% of GDP?
The SGP implementation led to strong tensions within the area 
(Tables 3 and 4). In 1999-2000, the largest countries refused to run 
restrictive policies, despite strong growth, because they did not 
want to undermine growth while domestic unemployment was 
still high. Thus, in the 2003-2004 economic downturn, deficits rose 
above the 3% of GDP limit and governments refused to undertake 
restrictive policies which would have deepened the recession. This 
led to an open crisis between the Commission and the Council in
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thanks to the recovery and to consolidation policies undertaken in 
Portugal, Germany and Italy. In mid-2008, no country was under 
an EDP. However, six countries ran public debts exceeding 60% of 
GDP: countries cannot meet a priori fiscal rules. There are still 
economists however (see for instance, Calmfors 2012) who blame 
countries for not having strictly conformed with the rules of the 
Pact, as if these rules have any economic justification. 
Table 2. Revision of the European Commission's structural balance estimates, 
2005-2011
In % of GDP
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP growth, % 1.8 3.2 2.8 0.3 -4.2 1.9 1.5
Public balance -2.5 -1.3 -0.7 -2.1 -6.4 -6.2 -4.1
Potential growth* 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.4 0.9 0.8 1.1
                            ** 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9
Output gap* 0.0 1.4 2.5 1.4 -3.7 -2.6 -2.2
                   ** -0.9 -0.2 0.2 -1.2 -7.3 -7.3 -7.7
Structural balance* -2.5 -2.0 -1.9 -2.8 -4.6 -5.0 -3.2
                              ** -2.0 -1.2 -0.7 -1.4 -2.6 -2.5 -0.1
* Autumn 2011 estimate; ** Spring 2008 estimate.
Source: European Commission (2008, 2011).
Table 3. Excessive deficit procedures
Source: European Commission.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Portugal
France
Germany
Netherlands
G reece
Italy
Spain
Ireland
Belg ium
Austria
F in land
24- Sept 11- May 22- June 03- June 07- Oct
02- Apr 30- Jan 18- Feb
19- Nov 16- May 07- Oct
28-  Apr  07- June 07- Oct
19- May 05- June 18- Feb
07- June 03- June 07- Oct
18- Feb
18- Feb
07- Oct
07- Oct
12- May
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in surplus according to the OECD estimates (Table 5). From 1997 
to 2007 the improvement in the structural euro area balance is due 
to decreasing interest payments and public expenditure (Table 6). 
Conversely it was limited due to lower tax revenues. The imple-
mentation of a tax harmonisation strategy in Europe would have 
prevented tax competition.
In 2007, debt was sustainable in all euro area countries (except 
in Greece and France, see Table 7). The gap was negative for the 
UK, the US, and even more for Japan. From a purely fiscal perspec-
tive, the assessment of the Pact is therefore mitigated. The Pact was 
probably binding, but less strongly that it intended. 
Fiscal policy rules were not helpful during the crisis. The crisis 
destroyed the reliability of structural balance estimates (see 
Table 2); it appeared that governments were not controlling their 
deficit levels, due to the over-reaction of revenues (corporate taxa-
tion, income taxation, inheritance and transfers tax). Governments 
implemented discretionary policies; the Commission had to accept 
the latter and even pretend to co-ordinate them, forgetting its 
discourses on their inefficiency. The objective of structural budget 
in balance was entirely put aside. Government deficits rose, both in 
their structural and cyclical components: the Stability Pact had to 
be put aside.     
Table 4. MS not fulfilling the rules
Public deficit/Public debt in % of GDP
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
PRT 4.3 3.1 3.4 5.9/63 4.1/64 3.2/68 3.6/72 10.1/83 9.2/93 5.9/108
FRA  3.2 4.1/63 3.6/65 3.0/66 /64 /64 3.3/68 7.5/78 7.0/82 5.6/85
DEU 3.6/60 4.0/64 3.8/66 3.3/68  /68 /65   /66 3.0/73 3.3/83 /84
NLD   3.2    5.5/61 5.3/63 3.7/66
GRC 4.4/104 4.8/102  5.7/97 7.4/99 5.3/103 6.0/106 6.7/105 9.8/111 15.6/127
10.4/
143 7.5/153
ITA 3.1/109 3.0/106 3.6/104 4.4/104 3.3/106 /106 /104 /106 5.3/116 4.5/119 3.9/121
ESP        4.2 11.1 9.2/60 5.9/68
IRL        7.3 14.3/66 32.4/96 10.1/114
BEL  /107 /103  /98  /94  /92 /88 /84   /90 6.0/96 4.2/97 3.6/97
AUT  /67 /66 /66 /65 /64 /62 /61   /64 4.2/70 4.6/72 3.7/74
Source : European Commission (2011).
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 GDP growth, %
Government 
balance, 
% of GDP
Interest pay-
ments, 
% of GDP
Cyclical 
component*,
% of GDP
Primary 
structural 
balance*,
% of GDP
1998 2.7 -2.3 4.1 -0.2/-1.3 2.1/3.2
1999 2.8 -1.5 3.6 0.1/-0.8 2.3/3.2
2000 3.9 -1.1 3.5 0.8/0.0 0.7/1.5
2001 2.0 -2.0 3.3 0.6 /0.0 0.9/1.5
2002 0.9 -2.7 3.1 -0.1/-0.5 0.4/0.8
2003 0.7 -3.1 3.0 -0.6/-1.2 -0.1/0.5
2004 2.0 -2.9 2.8 -0.4/-1.2 0.3/1.1
2005 1.8 -2.5 2.7 -0.3/-1.3 0.4/1.4
2006 3.3 -1.4 2.6 0.6/-0.6 0.9/2.1
2007 3.0 -0.7 2.6 1.3/-0.1 0.9/2.3
2008 0.3 -2.1 2.6 0.6 /-1.0 -0.1/1.5
2009 -4.2 -6.4 2.5 -2.0/-4.1 -2.3/-0.2
2010 1.8 -6.3 2.5 -1.5/-4.2 -1.7/1.0
2011 1.6 -4.0 2.6 -1.3/-4.3 -0.3/2.7
2012 0.2 -2.9 2.8 -1.8/-5.2 1.3/4.7
*OECD estimate / OFCE estimate.
Source : OECD, Economic Outlook, May 2012.
Table 6. Public finances from 1997 to 2007 (cyclically adjusted)
Change, in % of GDP
Revenues Interest payments
Primary 
expenditure
Government 
balance
Euro area -1.5 -1.6 -1.4 +1.5
Germany -2.5 -0.5 -3.7 +1.7
France -1.6 -0.6 -0.8 -0.2
Italy -1.0 -3.9 +2.2 -0.7
Spain +2.2 -3.1 +0.3 +5.1
Netherlands 0.0 -2.6 +0.8 +1.7
Belgium -0.5 -3.4 +2.3 +1.7
Greece +1.0 -3.1 +6.5 +2.4
Austria -4.6 -1.2 -5.0 +1.5
Portugal +3.8 -1.0 3.5 +1.2
Finland -2.4 -2.4 -6.4 +6.4
Source : OECD, Economic Outlook, May 2012.
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak216Public finances deteriorate in times of crisis when fiscal rules 
can no more play and are necessarily “forgotten”. Should fiscal 
rules be implemented, although they would not have allowed the 
policies run in 2008-2010? Is there a need for temporary fiscal rules 
to bring the economy out of the crisis? But how would such 
temporary rules make a trade-off between growth and public 
finances objectives? Between doing everything to bring deficits 
below 3% of GDP and debts below 60% of GDP and doing 
everything to support growth?
The strong deterioration of public finances during the crisis is 
not due to over-expansionary policies before the crisis (except for 
Greece). It results from the depth of the recession (which raises the 
issue of economic instability induced by financial globalisation), 
by banks’ recapitalisation in some countries (Ireland, which raises 
the issue of the regulation and supervision of the banking system), 
by the length of the crisis (which raises the issue of crisis exit strate-
gies), by the bad functioning of the euro area which leads financial 
Table 7. Public finances in 2007
In % of GDP
 Government balance
Primary 
public 
balance
Net 
debt
Real interest 
rate correc-
ted from 
growth
Debt 
stability 
gap
Change
 in debt,
2007/1997 
Germany 0.2 2.6 42.9  1.6  1.9 +10
France -2.7 0.2 34.0  0.2 -0.3 -8
Italy -1.7 3.0 89.6  0.9  2.2 -18
Spain  1.9 3.0 18,7 -3.2  3.6 -35
Netherlands  0.2 1.8 28.0  0.3  1.7 -20
Belgium -0.2 3.5 73.4 -0.2  3.6 -28
Austria -0.7 1.3 30.7 -0.3  1.4 -6
Greece -6.7 -3.0 80.4 -2.9  -0.7 +4
Portugal -2.3 0.6 44.1  0.6  0.3 +17
Finland  5.2 4.6 -71.1 -0.3  4.4 -67
Ireland 0.2 0.9 -0.3 -3.4  0.8 -42
Euro area -0.6 2.0 43.3 0.1 2.0 -10
United Kingdom -2.7 -0.7 28.8 -0.3 -0.6 -2
USA -2.8 -0.8 47.2 -1.1 -0.3 -6
Japan -2.5 -1.9 80.4  0.7 -2.6 +45
Source : OECD, Economic Outlook, November 2011.
Do we need fiscal rules? 217markets to bet against Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain, where the 
situation of public finances is not worse than in the US. 
The requested budgetary effort depends strongly on the esti-
mate of the cyclical component of government borrowing; in 2011 
it was nil at the euro area level according to us (since the primary 
structural balance was already in surplus), and amounted to 3% of 
GDP according to the European Commission (which aims at brin-
ging structural deficits in balance).
As a fiscal rule, the SGP Pact therefore has a negative assess-
ment. It was not met prior the crisis. It generated useless tensions. 
It did not allow to design an economic strategy before and during 
the crisis. It does not allow to define a crisis exit strategy.
3. Fiscal rules proposals
Although the rise in deficits and debts since the beginning of 
the financial crisis was not due to a drift in public finances, many 
economists and international institutions advocate exit strategies 
based on implementing fiscal rules in order to bring budgetary 
positions in balance. This raises two issues: how to define this new 
equilibrium? How to ensure that fiscal rules are consistent with 
macroeconomic equilibrium requirements? 
Even if the crisis has shown the need for active fiscal policies, 
some countries blame inappropriate fiscal policies for current diffi-
culties. Therefore, they wish more binding fiscal policy constraints. 
Should EU governments deprive themselves of weapons which 
were helpful during the crisis? 
In the euro area, Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland 
demand more binding rules as a counterpart of the increased fiscal 
solidarity needed in face of speculation against public debts. The 
objective is also to re-assure financial markets who have understood 
that public debts in the euro area have become risky assets. But any 
rule raises credibility issues. Too rigid rules implemented simulta-
neously in Europe will reduce GDP growth which will have vicious 
effects: falling output growth generates lower tax receipts, and raises 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, public finance targets will not be reached; 
rising unemployment and political and social tensions will increase 
the fears that the country defaults and even leaves the euro area. 
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3.1.1. Germany: The debt brake 
Germany introduced a “debt brake” in its Constitution, which 
forbids higher than 0.35% of GDP structural deficits from 2016. 
The cyclical deficit is estimated according to the fragile Commis-
sion’s method. According to that estimate, Germany would have 
run excessive structural deficits (i.e. above 0.35% of GDP) each year 
since 1974 (except in 1985 and 1989). But can we consider that a 
country with higher than 6.5% of GDP current account surpluses 
in 2005-2007 and a 1.5% inflation rate was running excessive 
public deficits? In fact, the debt brake is not more rigid than the 
SGP rules. But Germany did not fulfil the SGP.
Deviations from the rule may be allowed in case of “natural 
disaster or exceptional economic circumstances”. They should be 
passed in a Parliament vote, with a 2/3 majority. 
The law introduces a “notional adjustment account”, where 
deficits over the 0.35% ceiling (due to cyclical developments or a 
bad implementation of the budget) are recorded. These deficits will 
have to be cut either thanks to good economic times or to discre-
tionary policies. The amount of this account cannot exceed 1.5% 
of GDP. 
This rule is satisfactory neither in the short nor in the long 
term. In the short-term the definition of “exceptional situations” 
will be crucial. If growth decelerates, the fiscal policy constraint 
will depend strongly on the potential output estimate. In 2010, the 
German government deficit amounted to 4.3% of GDP. The struc-
tural deficit amounted to 3.5% of GDP according to the 
Commission or the OECD, to 1.3 % of GDP according to us. 
In the long-term, if German potential output is assumed to 
grow by 3% per year in nominal terms, running a 0.35% of GDP 
deficit would bring the public debt down to 12% of GDP. Is this 
realistic? 
With Germany having imposed on itself such a rule, the other 
EU countries are under market pressure to be as virtuous as 
Germany. 
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In 2010, the UK introduced an independent Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR), in charge of producing macroeconomic and 
fiscal forecasts and of assessing the government patrimonial 
accounts. In 2011, the government set the objective of bringing 
the structural current government borrowing in balance in five 
years, i.e. to apply the golden rule with the problems we 
mentioned earlier. The OBR has to assess if the fiscal policy imple-
mented will reach this objective (with a higher than 50% 
probability). What will the government do if active fiscal policy is 
needed in 2016? Fortunately, it will not be constrained by the 2011 
programme. Hence, the medium-term commitment is not so 
binding. 
3.1.3. A French-type rule? 
In March 2010, a Commission was appointed with the mandate 
of recommending a rule for public finances in balance (see 
Camdessus, 2010). From the beginning, the Commission chose to 
exclude wise rules like the true golden rule or the stabilisation of 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, and suggested instead a rule of a structural 
budget in balance, which forbids discretionary measures and 
imposes a too strong constraint in the medium term. There was 
however no macroeconomist among the members of the Commis-
sion, and stabilisation issues were forgotten. The Commission 
suggested that each new government commits themselves by law 
on a programme of structural deficit cuts and on a date at which 
the structural balance will be reached.  
The French government had proposed a complicated constitu-
tional law project. Each government had to commit themselves in 
a multiannual public finance law7, which should cover at least 3 
years and include, year by year, a public spending ceiling and an 
amount of new measures in terms of revenues (independently of 
the conjuncture). Higher than planned spending would be allowed 
only if associated with a similar rise in receipts. The government 
would have to commit initially on a fixed intangible scenario 
including each year structural deficits (public expenditure less 
receipts corrected from the conjuncture) cuts. The government 
7. With a content to be specified in an Organic law.
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reached. The Constitutional Council would be entitled to amend a 
finance law if the latter was not in conformity with this multian-
nual public finance law, i.e. if it involved a lower than planned 
fiscal effort.
The experience of the SGP had however shown that it is useless 
to ask governments to announce a public finance trajectory inde-
pendently of the cyclical context. In November 2007, the French 
government announced that the structural deficit would be cut 
down to 0.6% of GDP in 2011. In January 2010, the structural 
deficit target for 2011 had moved to 4% of GDP. Obviously, this 
rise in deficit was needed accounting for the crisis. But what would 
have happened if the budget had been constrained by a multian-
nual law passed in 2008? Does the French government consider it 
was wrong to support the economy in 2009, and that it should 
have been constrained to remain inactive? 
Some economists (like Boone and Pisani-Ferry, 2011) were 
requesting France to make more budgetary efforts: they requested 
that the multiannual law passed at the beginning of the Parlia-
ment, sets “the fiscal policy main parameters over a five-year 
period”, as if a rigid economic policy could be run without accoun-
ting for cyclical or structural developments. They requested the 
“correction of past deviations”: in 2013 or 2014, excessive deficits 
from 2009 or 2010 should be corrected without accounting for the 
effective cyclical circumstances over these years. An “independent 
public finance council” should be settled, and would be in charge 
of evaluating implemented fiscal policy. But who would appoint 
these experts? What would be the judgement criteria of these 
experts? 
This project was approved by a vote in the French National 
Assembly and the Senate, but not with a sufficiently large majority. 
It was therefore not adopted. 
However, the French government had from then clearly 
committed to follow the deficit public reduction path enshrined in 
the budget law (6% of GDP in 2011, 4.6% in 2012 and 3% in 2013), 
independently of cyclical developments. Hence, the announce-
ment of GDP growth 1 percentage point lower than anticipated for 
2012 induces austerity measures which dampen GDP growth 
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percentage point lower than anticipated, the government must 
implement measures amounting to 1 percentage point of GDP if it 
wishes to meet the a priori set target, which reduces ex post GDP 
growth by 2%.
3.2. The EU proposals
The European Commission’s legislative proposals on the SGP 
strengthening and the “Euro Plus Pact” aim at constraining all euro 
area MS to introduce binding fiscal rules in their constitution. The 
EU authorities did not learn the lessons from the disastrous euro 
area management before the crisis. This management was focusing 
on rigid public finance rules and not on a precise coordination of 
macroeconomic strategies, which increased disparities in Europe in 
a weak growth context (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2011). 
The debt crisis strengthened the weight of proponents of auto-
matic and without economic rationale fiscal rules. These 
proponents can now rely on financial markets’ threat, on the need 
to reassure financial markets, on the weight of Germany, which 
wishes increased EU solidarity to be paid by strengthened SGP 
rules. The Greek crisis is way to hide the financial crisis under the 
carpet. 
The proponents of strict rules point to the threat of financial 
markets and rating agencies. If a country does not include such 
rules in their constitution they will lose their precious AAA. Finan-
cial markets would lend at reasonable rates only to countries 
committing not to have to borrow. On the one hand, countries 
cumulating huge foreign currency reserves (like China, and oil 
producing countries), pension funds, and insurance companies 
wish to own huge public assets amounts. On the other hand, they 
refuse to lend to countries which need to borrow, at least without 
high risk premia. They refuse to accept that their accumulation of 
liquid assets has a counterpart in terms of debt. Such contradictory 
demands can only paralyse the world economy. 
On 29 September 2010, the Commission proposed a set of six 
legislative proposals aiming at “strengthening economic 
governance”:
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medium term objective of budgetary positions in balance, 
and the constraint for countries running a structural deficit 
to cut it by at least 0.5% of GDP per year. No lesson is drawn 
from past experience. 
— Countries will face sanctions if public spending increases 
more rapidly than prudent GDP growth (unless this is offset 
by a rise in taxation or if the country runs a fiscal surplus). 
This will prevent economic stabilisation through increased 
public spending. In times of economic depression, do we 
really need prudence? What would happen if by prudence 
households stop consuming or companies stop investing? 
— Countries will face sanctions if they do not cut their struc-
tural deficit by at least 0.5 percentage point per year.
— Countries running a higher than 60% of GDP debt ratio will 
be under an excessive deficit procedure if the debt ratio does 
not fall by 1/20th per year of the gap between the effective 
debt and the 60% reference value. But it is almost impossible 
to prevent the debt ratio to rise in times of economic 
slowdowns. This new rule is pro-cyclical: it strengthens the 
constraint on deficits in slow growth periods. A country with 
a 90% debt-to GDP ratio and a 2% annual inflation rate, will 
have to keep a public deficit at below or 2% of GDP if 
domestic GDP grows by 2%; the deficit will need to be below 
or at 1% if GDP grows by 1% only. 
— Guilty countries (countries with too rapid rises in public 
spending, countries not cutting their structural deficit, or 
not complying with an EDP) will have to make a deposit of 
between 0.2% and 0.5% of GDP, which will possibly be 
converted into a fine if the requested measures are not 
implemented. 
— MS will have to introduce EU rules in their domestic fiscal 
frameworks (the 3% and 60% limits, the medium-term target 
of budgetary positions in balance) and to implement a 
surveillance of the fulfilment of these rules by an “indepen-
dent budgetary institution”.
— A qualified majority will now be needed for the Council to 
oppose measures and sanctions recommended by the 
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of sanctions. 
The Commission’s proposal undermines MS autonomy; forces 
them to fulfil strictly rules without economic rationale, and 
reduces their ability to stabilise their economies. It will increase 
further tensions between the Commission and the MS. Expert 
Committees are given the mandate of monitoring fiscal policy, 
although the crisis has clearly shown that strong and determined 
policy responses are needed. 
The proposal was passed by the European Parliament while 
media remained silent and hence citizens entirely indifferent. The 
Parliament worsened the text: the Commission will be able sanc-
tion automatically a country not fulfilling the forecast path for 
deficits. 
According to the Euro plus pact adopted in March 2011, each 
MS must introduce in their fiscal framework or their Constitution a 
fiscal rule similar to the SGP, the Commission being in charge of 
verifying this similarity. 
In October 2011, the ECOFIN council specified that MS under 
an EDP, i.e. currently almost all euro area countries, will have to 
meet their budgetary targets independently of economic circums-
tances, in other words to implement pro-cyclical fiscal policies.
On 9 December 2011, the European Council proposed a “fiscal 
pact”, which merely repeats the already adopted framework. It 
became the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
(TSCG) and was signed on 2 March 2012. This text only recalls the 
six directives. Each country is requested to include in its Constitu-
tion a rule limiting the structural public deficit to 0.5% of GDP. It 
will have to converge rapidly towards this objective, according to a 
schedule given by the Commission. An automatic correction 
mechanism will have to be implemented in case of a deviation 
from this path. The EU Court of Justice will verify that the rule 
complies with the European rules. Countries will have to cut their 
deficit, according to a schedule proposed by the Commission. 
Countries under an EDP have to submit their budgets and struc-
tural reform programmes to the Commission and the Council, 
which will make recommendations and monitor budget imple-
mentation. A qualified majority of euro area governments will be 
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countries breaching the 3% ceiling or not complying with instruc-
tions given by the Commission. MS will have to introduce 
independent fiscal committees in charge of verifying that the 
balanced budget rule is met and the adjustment path.
This project is dangerous from an economic point of view 
because it imposes an arbitrary public deficit rule; it imposes quasi-
automatic fiscal policies; it prohibits any discretionary policy to 
support activity. But discretionary policies are needed to stabilise 
the economy. Let us assume that the tax-to-GDP ratio is 50% and 
propensity to consume is 1. Then the multiplier equals 2. If private 
spending falls by 10 ex ante, this will lead output to fall by 20 in the 
absence of any fiscal policy response, and the public deficit will rise 
by 10. Fiscal expansion raising public expenditure by 10 will lead 
to the same rise in deficit but will prevent output from falling. 
Such a policy would be forbidden according to the law proposal. 
The proposal is based on an implicit and wrong theory: automatic 
stabilisers should be allowed to work, but discretionary stabilisa-
tion fiscal policies should be forbidden. At the end of 2008, the 
IMF, the G20 and the European Commission requested countries 
to implement such discretionary policies. Should these policies 
have been abandoned two years later? 
MS will lose fiscal autonomy. Implementing this Pact would be 
a serious setback for democracy in Europe.
In fact, the aim is to impose strong commitments to MS in order 
to convince Germany and the other Northern countries to accept 
more financial solidarity in Europe, to persuade the ECB to inter-
vene more strongly by buying public debts, and more importantly 
to announce its intention to do it as long as necessary. But so far 
Germany and the ECB are not convinced that they should follow 
this strategy.
Last, some economists and even ministers in Germany or the 
Netherlands requested that a country not fulfilling the SGP may be 
condemned by the European Court of Justice. Fiscal policy would 
be submitted to the judiciary power. Jean-Claude Trichet, the then 
ECB President, and Wolfgang Schaüble, the German minister for 
finance, proposed that a Commissioner be responsible for euro 
area MS public finances, be allowed to supervise MS budgets, and 
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rules, inconsistent with macroeconomic governance needs are 
implemented. This is the ambiguity of current European construc-
tion: better economic policies coordination is needed, but a strictly 
numerical control of public deficits levels is neither economic 
policy coordination, nor an optimal rule.
3.2.1. A French-type rule? Bis 
In October 2012, the French government has had the Parliament 
enact an “Organic law relating to the planning and governance of 
public finances” (loi organique relative à la programmation et à la 
gouvernance des finances publiques, LPFP), which translates into 
French law the European Fiscal pact (the TSCG). In fact, the govern-
ment chose to take account ad minima of the Treaty, since the new 
fiscal procedure is not included in the constitution. 
Article 1 of the Organic Law stipulates that: “In accordance with 
the objective of running government accounts in balance as set out 
in Article 34 of the Constitution, the LPFP sets the medium-term 
targets of the government administrations referred to in Article 3 
of the TSCG.” But how can a Programming law “set a target” when 
the target derives from Article 3 of the Treaty, which clearly states 
that the target should be a structural deficit of below 0.5% of GDP 
and that an adjustment path to ensure a rapid convergence 
towards equilibrium will be proposed by the European Commis-
sion? The ambiguity of this article reflects an attempt to reconcile 
the irreconcilable: the sovereignty of Parliament in budgetary 
matters with France’s commitment to follow the recommenda-
tions of the Commission.
The programming law will cover 4 to 5 years, but will be voted 
again by the Parliament each year  and so the constraint will 
possibly be amended with the vote of a new programming law, as 
this has been the case in France since the SGP was introduced. 
Thus the programming law as such does not introduce additional 
constraints to those already required by European treaties. 
The organic law establishes a High Council of Public Finances, 
which will give advice on the macroeconomic forecasts underlying 
the finance law project, on the Stability programme which France 
has to submit to EU authorities, on the LPFP. The High Council 
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trajectory announced in the LPFP. He will give his opinion on the 
existence of “exceptional circumstances”. 
The High Council will be chaired by the President of the Cour 
des comptes (Court of audit) and will consist of 4 members of the 
Cour des comptes and four members appointed due to their exper-
tise in public finances by the Presidents of the French National 
Assembly, the Senate and two Finance Commissions. The Cour des 
comptes will have a prevailing role, which is problematic. The Cour 
des comptes’ judicial officers are not a priori macroeconomic 
experts, and because of their job position are often more 
concerned with public finances in balance than with output 
growth and employment. The latest Cour des Comptes’ Reports have 
for instance underestimated the size of the output gap, they 
support the thesis according to which the fiscal multiplier is close 
to 0 and that public expenditure cuts are more relevant than 
increases in taxes. We would like to be sure that the Cour des 
Comptes’ judicial officers will express their own views in full inde-
pendence, and that the High Council’s Reports will reflect a 
diversity of opinions; which is not currently the case in the Cour 
des Comptes’ Reports.
More fundamentally, one may wonder whether there will be 
some flexibility in the High Council’ assessments. Will the High 
Council be entitled to conclude that the adjustment path is too 
restrictive, and that the medium-term target is not realistic? What 
strategy will be advocated by the High Council in the event of an 
economic slowdown: an expansionary policy to support growth or 
an austerity policy to restore public finances?
Finally, a question needs to be raised: what will be the legiti-
macy of this High Council? Fiscal policy choices must be subject to 
democratic procedures. Economic policy assessment is part of a 
scientific, democratic debate. Should it be entrusted to a High 
Council, composed mainly of judicial experts, rather than econo-
mists on the one hand and representatives of the nation on the 
other hand?
The High Council will only give advice, which neither the 
government nor the Parliament are obliged to follow, but the risk 
is great that these recommendations influence financial markets 
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not to fulfill them strictly.
To ensure that countries do indeed follow the adjustment path, 
the Treaty requires countries to provide an automatic correction 
mechanism if deviations are observed with respect to this path. In 
the spirit of the negotiators from Northern European countries and 
from the Commission, this mechanism should stipulate that in the 
event of 1% of GDP deviation in year N, the Constitution ensures 
that, automatically, some taxes (e.g. VAT) are raised by 0.5 percen-
tage point of GDP and some expenditures (e.g. social benefits) are 
cut by 0.5 percentage point of GDP. As a matter of fact, Chapter 3 
of France’s Organic Law provides that the High Council reports 
such a deviation, that the government explains the reasons for this 
deviation and then takes them into account when elaborating the 
next finance law. Parliament’s rights are respected, but fortunately 
the automaticity of the correcting mechanism is not guaranteed. 
In the spirit of its founders, the fiscal treaty should put an end 
to the possibility of autonomous domestic fiscal policies. Fiscal 
policies should become automatic. Fiscal policy should aim at 
budgets in balance, just as monetary policy must be to prevent 
inflation; growth and employment shall be sought through free 
market structural reforms. The Organic Law seems to be an ambi-
guous compromise. France is ratifying the Treaty, but implements 
it only reluctantly. It’s a safe bet that, as with the Stability Pact, 
there will be great tensions in the euro area between those who 
demand the strict enforcement of the Treaty and those who do not 
want to sacrifice growth to it.
3.3. Fiscal rules and markets
In 2011, most euro area economies ran close to primary struc-
tural balances, in other words their debt ratio would be stable if 
they could borrow at interest rates equal to output growth 
(Table 8). This is not the case for Japan, the US, and the UK. 
Besides, euro area countries suffer from a much higher interest rate 
than countries outside the euro area, although they have smaller 
imbalances. There is a specific cost for euro area countries.
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financial markets constraints. Since 1945, no industrial country 
defaulted on its public debt. Public debt was a safe asset, since 
governments were borrowing in their own currency and could 
always ask for central bank financing. Industrial countries bene-
fited from “monetary sovereignty”. This is always the case today 
for Japan (where 10-year government bonds interest rates are at 
1%, despite a government debt of 205% of GDP), the US (where 10-
year government bonds interest rates are at 2%, despite a govern-
ment debt of 100% of GDP) and the UK (where interest rates are 
also at 2% with a debt of 85% of GDP). It is a nonsense that rating 
agencies rate governments having monetary sovereignty, as if the 
latter could possibly default. Countries with monetary sovereignty 
should abandon their AAA: by nature, their debt is safe since it is 
guaranteed by the monetary power of their central bank.
Euro area countries have lost their “monetary sovereignty”: 
according the EU Treaty, the ECB is not allowed to finance govern-
ments; there is no solidarity between MS. Financial markets 
Table 8. Selected indicators for countries' economic situation in 2011
Current 
account,
% of GDP
Public 
deficit,
% of GDP
Public 
debt,
% of GDP
Average 
growth,
2011 and  
2012
Grade, 
Over 20*
Primary 
structural 
balance,
% of GDP
10-year 
interest 
rate,
2011Q4
FIN -0.6 -0.9 49 1.9 17.5 -0.7 2.5
DEU 5.7 -1.0 81 2.2 17.5 1.0 1.9
AUT 1.9 -2.6 72 1.9 16.1 0.1 3.1
NLD 9.2 -4.6 65 0.4 15.4 -2.4 2.4
BEL -0.8 -3.9 98 1.2 12.5 -0.6 4.4
FRA -2.1 -5.2 86 1.2 10.7 -1.6 3.2
US -3.1 -9.7 103 2.1 9.6 -5.7 2.0
UK -1.9 -8.4 83 0.6 9.6 -4.2 2.3
SPN -3.5 -8.5 69 -0.5 8.6 -3.7 5.7
JPN 2.6 -9.5 206 0.7 8.2 -7.4 1.0
IRL 0.1 -13.0 108 0.7 7.5 -2.0 8.7
ITA -3.1 -3.8 120 -0.6 7.5 1.4 6.6
PRT -6.4 -4.2 108 -2.4 6.4 -1.5 12.2
GRC -9.8 -9.2 165 -6.1 2.9 1.1 19.0
* This grade is the average of each country's rank according to four criteria: current account, public deficit, public 
debt and output growth.  
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, May 2012. Authors' calculations.
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started on the more fragile euro area countries: Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland, and then by a domino effect, Italy, Spain, and even 
Belgium. In December 2011, Belgium had to pay an interest rate at 
4.3%, Spain at 5.3% and Italy at 6.6% against 3.1% for France and 
1.85% for Germany. Greece, Ireland and Portugal are brought back 
to a situation of developing economies in the past: their debts have 
become risky assets, facing substantial risk premia; they have to 
obey the caudine forks of the IMF. 
Thus, fiscal policy may be entirely paralysed.  In a country with 
monetary sovereignty, in times of recession the central bank may 
cut its interest rate down to the lowest level and be committed to 
keep it durably low; the government increases its deficit, but the 
low level of interest rates avoids public debt to increase under a 
“snowball effect”; this leads the exchange rate to fall, which 
supports output. The debt guarantees by the central bank implies 
that there is no default risk, hence no reason for being obliged to 
reassure markets in permanence. The central bank will keep inte-
rest rates low in times of depression and this will ensure fiscal 
policy effectiveness. Fiscal policy does not have to care about 
markets. This is still the strategy of the US. 
In the euro area the risk is that a country may be unable to 
increase its deficit under the fear that government debt will be 
downgraded by rating agencies and that interest rates increase 
strongly. Countries have therefore no choice but to engage in 
beauty contests, in order to appear as virtuous as Germany in the 
markets’ eyes. Their fiscal policy becomes ineffective and hence 
their cyclical position cannot be stabilised. Public debt becomes a 
permanent risk factor, since governments are at the mercy of 
markets’ animal spirits. Any economic policy would have to be 
assessed accounting for markets’ opinion. But markets do not have 
any particular macroeconomic expertise. They demand austerity 
measures in depressed times and afterwards complain about insuf-
ficient output growth. This is how they proceed nowadays for the 
euro area in general, for Italy and Greece in particular. They favour 
free-market reforms, such as reducing social protection or the 
number of teachers. The default risk must be inexistent for 
countries to remain able to stabilise their economy. 
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getting reformed in order to guarantee MS government debts; MS 
would find their “monetary sovereignty” again. EU public debts 
should become safe assets again, with low interest rates but fully 
guaranteed (by EU solidarity and fundamentally by the ECB). This 
is the only way to maintain domestic fiscal autonomy, which is 
necessary due to disparities in Europe and to the loss of the mone-
tary instrument and of the exchange rate .
The euro area framework was not appropriately designed 
initially, especially as concerns the trade off between “fiscal policy 
autonomy/single currency/monetary sovereignty”. The joint 
guarantee creates a moral hazard problem, since each country may 
increase its debt with no limit, but the absence of guarantee leaves 
the door open to financial markets always ready to bet against 
some countries. The guarantee cannot be restricted to countries 
fulfilling the automatic fiscal rules of the SGP or the fiscal pact, 
which lack economic rationale. It cannot be restricted to countries 
committed to follow a pre-defined trajectory for public deficits, 
without accounting for the cyclical situation (as propose Doluca et 
al., 2013). Such a commitment would oblige countries to imple-
ment simultaneously restrictive policies in times of economic 
slowdown, multiplying by almost 4 the size of the shock ex ante
(see Box 2). 
Contrary to what several economists propose (and among them 
even de Grauwe, 2012), this guarantee cannot be limited to 60% of 
GDP. The 60% of GDP figure is arbitrary, and does not fit with the 
needs of macroeconomic equilibrium. The non-guaranteed debt 
would be considered as highly risky and markets would require 
high interest rates. Since almost all euro area countries run govern-
ment debts of more than 60% of GDP, they would have to borrow 
at high interest rates. The interest rate spread between the two types 
of debt would allow financial markets to speculate in permanence. 
Euro area countries would not have to reassure markets 
anymore. They could implement differentiated but coordinated 
strategies, setting themselves a main target of bringing their 
economy to a satisfactory employment level, consistent with 
moderate inflation. 
Do we need fiscal rules? 2314. Conclusion 
Due to the crisis, there is probably a need for a more transparent 
fiscal policy management: governments should set out clearly their 
output growth target, temporary expansionary measures should be 
clearly announced as such, the structural balance should not 
include temporary expansionary measures; the public deficit target 
should be explicit, but this target can only be the true golden rule 
and should be assessed accounting for the macroeconomic context. 
But fiscal rules proponents forget that fiscal policy cannot be 
managed on its own, under arbitrary criteria. Fiscal policy should 
set itself the objective of maintaining (or reaching) a satisfactory 
employment level albeit allowing inflation and interest rates to 
remain at satisfactory levels. Government deficit and debt should 
be derived from this objective. 
The emergency today is not to strengthen public finance disci-
pline by cutting deficits blindly but to question economic 
developments (financial globalisation, the wish of many countries 
to build surpluses, the change in incomes distribution), which 
make these deficits necessary to support output (Mathieu and Ster-
dyniak, 2011). 
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